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In a modern technological environment where information systems are characterized by complexity, situations of non-eﬀective oper-
ation should be anticipated. Often system failures are a result of insuﬃcient planning or equipment malfunction, indicating that it is
essential to develop techniques for predicting and addressing a system failure. Particularly for safety–critical applications such as the
healthcare information systems, which are dealing with human health, risk analysis should be considered a necessity. This paper presents
a new method for performing a risk analysis study of health information systems. Speciﬁcally, the CCTA Risk Analysis and Management
Methodology (CRAMM) has been utilized for identifying and valuating the assets, threats, and vulnerabilities of the information system,
followed by a graphical modeling of their interrelationships using Bayesian Networks. The proposed method exploits the results of the
CRAMM-based risk analysis for developing a Bayesian Network model, which presents concisely all the interactions of the undesirable
events for the system. Based on ‘‘what–if’’ studies of system operation, the Bayesian Network model identiﬁes and prioritizes the most
critical events. The proposed risk analysis framework has been applied to a vital signs monitoring information system for homecare tele-
medicine, namely the VITAL-Home System, developed and maintained for a private medical center (Medical Diagnosis and Treatment
S.A.).
 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Nowadays, health delivery practices for speciﬁc popula-
tions, such as patients suﬀering from chronic diseases or
elderly people, are shifting towards the constant health
monitoring; 24 h/day, 7 days per week. Health monitoring
may be delivered not only in a hospital environment but at
home as well, through the establishment of modern patient
telemonitoring systems [1–4]. The reasons are better possi-
bilities for managing chronic care, controlling health deliv-
ery costs, increasing quality of life, and quality of health
services and distinct possibility of predicting and thus
avoiding serious complications [5].
Homecare equipment for people with chronic diseases
requiring a constant monitoring includes appliances that1532-0464/$ - see front matter  2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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performing safety–critical applications and therefore
concentrate the ongoing concern that they might fail
and cause harm [6]. In the past, there are examples of
computer-based systems providing health care that have
failed producing catastrophic results for patients health.
The most famous incident is the one regarding Therac-
25, a therapeutic computer system intended to heal, but
inadvertently killed and harmed patients before being
removed of the market [7].
Furthermore, medical data maintained in health infor-
mation systems are directly related to the patients health
and safety. According to the Recommendation No. R
(97) 5 on the Protection of Medical Data issued by the
Council of Europe, appropriate technical and organiza-
tional measures must be taken to protect personal data
against any accidental or illegal destruction, accidental
loss, as well as against unauthorized access [8]. These pos-
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tem reliability and discourage professionals of future use.
Therefore, the execution of a risk analysis is a necessity
to assure a health information systems safety and Quality
of Service (QoS). This analysis should clearly specify all the
possible risks that may lead to system unavailability or
security violation and identify appropriate countermea-
sures to combat these risks. Several risk analysis methodol-
ogies have been proposed in literature, which are currently
available in the form of guidelines to be applied manually
or through interactive software packages. Furthermore,
in most cases these guidelines are combined with modeling
techniques that are widely applied in reliability and safety
engineering, such as Fault Trees, Event Trees, Markov
Chains, and FMEA (Failure Mode Eﬀects Analysis) [9–
11]. These techniques provide representation of system
operation and undesirable events and validation of system
safety level [12–16].
This paper presents a new method for performing a risk
analysis study of a healthcare telemonitoring system. The
UK Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency
(CCTA) Risk Analysis and Management Methodology
(CRAMM) has been applied for identifying the informa-
tion systems asset values, threats, vulnerabilities, and the
corresponding risks [17]. Initially, the user services, oﬀered
by the health information system and identiﬁed by the
CRAMM methodology, are used for the construction of
a Fault Tree representing the logical interrelationships of
failure events that may lead to a hazardous condition.
Finally, these relationships are represented using an
advanced Bayesian Network model that provides greater
ﬂexibility in modeling failure event scenarios and highlight-
ing system critical areas. The proposed risk analysis frame-
work has been applied to a vital signs monitoring
information system for homecare telemedicine, namely
the VITAL-Home System, developed and maintained for
a private medical center (Medical Diagnosis and Treatment
S.A.).
2. Risk analysis of healthcare information systems
In recent years, the escalating advances in information
and communication technologies created many new oppor-
tunities, but also an environment with more risks than ever
before. Managers, engineers, and information security pro-
fessionals should evaluate the speciﬁc risks in information
systems in a concise and systematic way. As far as health-
care information systems are concerned, quality of health
services and security of medical data play an important role
in the wide acceptance of new technologies by patients and
practitioners. Therefore, novel health information systems
must be accompanied by a risk analysis, identifying the
threats and vulnerabilities of the system and, in some cases,
providing a system model of all interrelationships among
the various events that inﬂuence system safety [15].
Risk analysis involves the identiﬁcation and assessment
of the levels of risks calculated from the known values ofassets and the levels of threats to, and vulnerabilities of,
those assets [12,17]. Furthermore, risk management
involves the identiﬁcation, selection, and adoption of coun-
termeasures justiﬁed by the identiﬁed risks to assets and the
reduction of those risks to acceptable levels. Several meth-
ods have been developed and applied to information sys-
tems. In the proposed risk analysis method, the main
steps of the CRAMM methodology have been adopted
[17]. CRAMM is owned, administered, and maintained
by the Security Service on behalf of the UK Government.
In line with nearly all risk analysis methods, CRAMM
asserts that risk is dependent on the asset values, the
threats, and the vulnerabilities. Moreover, it enables the
practitioner to build a system model encapsulating the
asset interdependencies; it provides useful insights into sys-
tem operational characteristics as well as a comprehensive
identiﬁcation of which assets are at greatest risk, due to
what threats, and with what impacts should those threats
succeed.
Speciﬁcally, the CRAMM methodology is organized in
three main stages. First, system assets are identiﬁed and
categorized as data, application software, and physical
assets (equipment, buildings, and staﬀ). Data assets are val-
ued in terms of their impacts on breaches of conﬁdentiality,
integrity, availability, and non-repudiation, which are the
widely accepted principles of information security. Appli-
cation and physical assets are valued in terms of their
unavailability, replacement or reconstruction cost. The
likely threats and known vulnerabilities are quantiﬁed
against selected asset groups, while their likelihood of
occurrence is estimated using predeﬁned levels of threat
and vulnerability (e.g., ‘‘Very Low,’’ ‘‘Low,’’ ‘‘Medium,’’
‘‘High,’’ and ‘‘Very High’’). Finally to manage the identi-
ﬁed risks, a set of countermeasures applicable to the infor-
mation system is produced.
3. Modeling system safety: Fault Trees vs Bayesian
Networks
3.1. Basic principles of the Fault Trees
Fault Tree analysis was originally introduced to facili-
tate the safety analysis of system designs by providing
insight into system operation and illuminating potential
weaknesses, with respect to reliability or safety [10,12]. A
Fault Tree system model is a graphical representation of
logical interrelationships between undesirable events, lead-
ing to a hazardous system state [18]. It depicts the combi-
nations of undesirable events that lead to the hazardous
system state (top event) by means of their logical-gate inter-
relationships. The quantitative analysis of a Fault Tree is
used to determine the probability of occurrence of the
top event, given the respective probabilities for the undesir-
able events. From a system design perspective, the Fault
Tree analysis provides a logical framework for understand-
ing the ways in which a system can fail, which is often as
important as understanding how a system can succeed.
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Fig. 1. (A 0) A simple Bayesian Network with three parent nodes (A, B,
and C) and one child node (D), all the variables are discrete, (B 0) the
conditional probability table of node D, considering each node A, B, C,
and D has two mutually exclusive and independent states. The probabil-
ities P1–P16 are conditional probabilities of the states d1 and d2 of the D
node given the states of the parent nodes.
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undesirable scenario being considered, and decomposes
the corresponding symptom into its possible causes. Each
possible cause is then investigated and further reﬁned until
the primary events are identiﬁed. The primary events are
the undesirable events that are not further developed into
possible causes in the present analysis, such as component
failures, missed actuation signals, human errors. The pri-
mary events constitute the limit of resolution of the Fault
Tree analysis. The combinations of the fewest primary
events that bring on the top event, if they occur simulta-
neously, are called minimal cutsets.
The resolution of the top event into its constituent caus-
es and further down to the primary events is generally
implemented by logical AND–OR gates. The use of other
types of logical gates such as NOT, XOR requires a diﬀer-
ent quantitative approach with increased computational
eﬀort. The qualitative analysis aims at relating the top
event with the primary events in a concise and systematic
way. Therefore, based on the process of Boolean reduction
of a set of equations, the top event is expressed as the uni-
ﬁcation of the minimal cutsets, which in turn equal to the
intersection of their constituent primary events:
QTE ¼ [
n
i¼1
QMCSi ¼ [
n
i¼1
\
Ai
QPj
 
; ð1Þ
where TE is the top event,MCSi is the ithminimal cutset, n is
the total number of minimal cutsets, Pj is the jth primary
event, andAi is the set of primary event indices that comprise
minimal cutset i. For example, if a Fault Tree has 30 primary
events P1–P30, andMCS2may be consisted of primary events
P2, P7, andP10, thenA2 = {2,7,10} and these are the values of
j. The quantitative analysis represents a calculation of the
top event probability. Considering the assumption that the
primary events are mutually independent, the top event
probability of failure QTE is calculated as
QTE ¼
Xn
i¼1
QMCSi ¼
Xn
i¼1
Y
Ai
QPj
 !
; ð2Þ
where QMCSi is the probability of failure of the minimal cut-
set i and QPj is the primary events j probability of failure
and Ai is the set of primary event indices that comprise
minimal cutset i. Moreover, certain importance measures
can be calculated for the minimal cutsets and the primary
events to pinpoint their impact on the occurrence of the
top event. As proposed by Fussel–Vesely, the importance
measures for each minimal cutset MCS, IMCS and for each
component i, Ii can be deﬁned as
IMCS ¼ QMCSQTE
and I i ¼
Pmi
j¼1Qj
QTE
; ð3Þ
where QMCS is the probability of occurrence of minimal
cutset MCS, Qj is the probability of occurrence of the jth
cutset which contains component i, m is the number of
minimal cutsets that contain component i, and QTE is the
top event probability of occurrence [12].3.2. Basic principles of the Bayesian Networks for modeling
cause–eﬀect relationships
Bayesian Networks are a set of methods for graphical
representation and probabilistic calculation for most prob-
lems characterized by uncertainty [19]. Bayesian Networks
consist of a set of variables and a set of directed edges
between variables, and they are very eﬀective in represent-
ing possible ‘‘cause–eﬀect’’ relationships. The variables that
aﬀect another variables state (‘‘child’’) are called ‘‘par-
ents’’. The variables that have no parents are called root
variables. In the generic case, Bayesian Networks variables
can be either discrete or continuous. In the case of discrete
variables, each variable has a ﬁnite set of mutually exclu-
sive states. The states of the ‘‘child’’ variable Xi with par-
ents B1,B2, . . . ,Bn (n > 1) are described by an attached
conditional probability table P (XijB1,B2, . . . ,Bn). For the
variables X1,X2, . . . ,Xn of a Bayesian Network the proba-
bility of the joint event X1X2    Xn is given by
P ðX 1;X 2; . . . ;XnÞ ¼
Yn
i¼1
P ½X ijParentðX iÞ; ð4Þ
where Parent (Xi) is the set of parent variables of the vari-
able Xi. In Fig. 1A
0, a simple Bayesian Network with dis-
crete variables is depicted with three parent and one child
node while in Fig. 1B 0 the conditional probability table
of the child node is presented.
Building and using a Bayesian Network consisting of
discrete variables is essentially a three-stage process. The
ﬁrst stage includes the determination of the variables and
their cause–eﬀect relationships, while the second stage
includes the speciﬁcations of each variable states condi-
tional probability, given the state of the parent variables.
The third stage is inference, during which the input data
is entered to the Bayesian Network model and the proba-
bilities for all Network nodes are calculated according to
the cause–eﬀect relationships. Furthermore, Bayesian infer-
ence includes the calculation of the posterior probabilities
for the variable states given a system fault or a certain com-
bination of events, the joint probability of combination of
variable states and the determination of the most probable
combination of variable states.
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Fault Trees are very popular in dependability modeling,
system reliability analysis, evaluation of large safety–criti-
cal systems, and graphical representation of cause–eﬀect
relationships in risk analysis [10,12,18]. They are construct-
ed using a top–down approach, from the events to their
causes, until no further decomposition is possible or
required, and the primary events are identiﬁed. The meth-
odology is based on several assumptions. The events are
considered binary (two possible states) and statistically
independent, while relationships between events and causes
are represented by means of logical AND–OR gates. Cur-
rently, several new Fault Tree tools relax the last assump-
tion, while introducing considerable computational eﬀort
in the quantitative analysis of the Fault Tree models
[18,20]. The Fault Tree model provides a framework for
the estimation of occurrence probability regarding the
undesirable top event and the minimal cutsets and the
importance measures provide indications for the events of
the highest risk for system safety. However, Bayesian Net-
works provide greater ﬂexibility in representing uncertain
data and investigating diﬀerent system operational scenar-
ios [21,22].
The Bayesian Networks is a widely used modeling tech-
nique for representing uncertain knowledge in probabilistic
systems. The exciting feature of this technique is that it is
possible to include local conditional dependencies into
the model, by directly specifying the causes that inﬂuence
a given eﬀect, and therefore contribute signiﬁcantly in fault
diagnosis and risk prioritization. Furthermore, Bayesian
Networks provide the ﬂexibility of modeling events with
more than two possible states, while other operational
dependencies in system modeling such as common cause
failures, sequentially dependent failures can be modeled
more easily than using the Fault Tree formalism. In the
context of the present risk analysis framework, the use of
Bayesian Networks provides a concise graphical represen-
tation of the cause–eﬀect interrelationships among threats,
vulnerabilities, and assets in the risk analysis of informa-
tion systems, while the conditional dependencies among
the events and the probabilistic inference of the Bayesian
Network aim signiﬁcantly in a more realistic risk prioritiza-
tion of the undesirable events for system safety. The impor-
tance measures of the Fault Tree method are calculated
arbitrarily of the existence or not of the top event or any
other possible evidence for the tree events. However, the
conditional probabilities given the existence or not of cer-
tain events incorporate this evidence in their calculation
and result in a more realistic ranking of primary events
[21].
4. The VITAL-Home patient monitoring system
Home oﬀers a considerably diﬀerent environment com-
pared to a hospital or to a health care unit. Facilities for
medical practice at home are limited by the availability ofportable patient monitors for such applications. These
new systems provide automated connection with remote
access and seamless transmission of biological and other
data. The patient or elder will mainly require monitoring
of his vital signals (i.e., ECG, blood pressure, heart rate,
breath rate, oxygen saturation, and perspiration) [3,24–
27]. Patients recently discharged from hospital after some
form of intervention, for instance, after a cardiac episode,
cardiac surgery or a diabetic comma are less secure and
require enhanced care. The most common forms of special
home monitoring are ECG arrhythmia monitoring, post
surgical monitoring, respiratory, and blood oxygen levels
monitoring and sleep apnoea monitoring.
VITAL-Home system is a patient monitoring system,
aiming at fulﬁlling this gap in the continuation and coordi-
nation of healthcare after the patient leaves the hospital
and returns to his home. The architectural model of the
VITAL-Home system is depicted in Fig. 2.
The VITAL-Home model is architecturally divided into
two diﬀerent operational subsystems. The ﬁrst serves the
purpose of acquiring and encoding vital signs and it is
located at the patients home. This part of the system is
duplicated for each patient. The second collects, through
a communication link, the vital signs to decode, monitor,
process, and store them. This is located at the Healthcare
Center providing the ‘‘Monitoring Service.’’ A Portable
Vital Signs Monitor (PVSM) and corresponding biosensors
are located at the patients home, measuring bio-signals.
The PVSM equipments are connected through a Bluetooth
link to a personal computer, also located at the patients
home, transferring all recorded vital signs to the PC. The
encoded medical data will be stored locally in the PC.
Patients medical data may be transferred to the Health
Care Center (HCC) either through a ﬁxed line (i.e., PSTN,
ISDN, and ADSL), or a mobile channel such as GPRS, or
UMTS.
At the HCC site there is a central server that collects,
decodes, monitors, processes, and stores the vital signs
transmitted by the remote patients locations. In terms of
the communication equipment, the infrastructure is similar
to that described for the patients home.
The applications that are hosted in the HCC central
server are:
• The VITAL-DICOM decoder software, allowing the
decoding of vital signs received by patients.
• The Electronic Health Record software, for maintaining
patients identiﬁcation and other demographic informa-
tion, as well as for storing and processing his medical
history and the vital signs generated while using the
VITAL-Home service.
• The Vital Signs Monitoring software that will facilitate
the display of vital signs on the servers screen, thus
enabling the remote monitoring of patients health.
• The Logging software that will record all voice commu-
nication between the HCC and patients or attending
doctors.
HEALTH CARE CENTER 
VITAL-Home DECODER 
MONITORING AND STORAGE SERVER 
PC 
VITAL-Home ENCODER 
FIXED NETWORK 
PSTN, DSL, CABLE 
MOBILE NETWORK 
GPRS, UMTS, SATELITE 
Modem  Modem 
Mobile Modem 
or Set of Box
Modem 
Portable Vital Signs  
Monitor Device
RS-232 
PATIENT'S 
HOME 
HEALTH CARE 
CENTER 
Storage 
INTERNET PSTN 
Attending Doctors Hospitals 
HCC Printer 
Fig. 2. Architectural model of the VITAL-Home system.
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the previously described VITAL-Home system are
explored and analyzed based on the proposed risk analysis
framework.
5. Risk analysis of the VITAL-Home system
The risk analysis of the VITAL-Home system, in accor-
dance to the guidelines of the CRAMM methodology, has
been performed by experienced CRAMM-certiﬁed risk
analysts. However, several key persons of the service pro-
vider (Medical Diagnosis and Treatment S.A.) have active-
ly participated in the study by providing, through
interviews or questionnaires, the information required by
the analysts. It should be stressed at this point, that the risk
analysts have presented the results of each stage to the
management of the medical center, to get their agreement
and also obtain their permission to proceed with the study.
The ﬁrst stage of the VITAL-Home system risk analysis
comprises of the identiﬁcation and the valuation of the
information systems assets. Valuation concerns the data
maintained by the HCC and the patient, as well as the
hardware and software applications used for the provision
of the VITAL-Home service. The risk analyst decides the
level of granularity for the identiﬁcation of the information
systems assets, in accordance to the CRAMM guidelines.
However, the main approach is to identify, as distinct
assets, all data categories that may disrupt the user service
if their availability, conﬁdentiality or integrity is compro-mised. The hardware and software assets are those associ-
ated with the aforementioned data categories and thus with
the oﬀered user service. The valuation was performed on
the basis of the possible impacts that a threat may cause
to the HCC and the patient.
5.1. Data assets
It should be noted that since the VITAL-Home system
deals with medical data (conﬁdential information) and it
is directly related with the safety of the patient, the security,
trust, and reliability are the key services of the HCC to the
patients. Therefore, a security incident is not just an inter-
nal problem of the HCC (replacement cost) but has an
immediate eﬀect on the trust of patients to the system
and thus to the capability of the HCC to oﬀer reliable
Healthcare Services. Therefore, the data valuation was
done by estimating the impact that could be caused by
the loss of data availability and/or data conﬁdentiality
and/or data integrity, always considering the worst case
scenario. The identiﬁed data assets of the VITAL-Home
system were categorized into the following classes: Patient
Medical Records, Encoded Vital Signs, Reporting Data,
and Voice-Log Data.5.2. Hardware assets
The hardware assets required at both the HCC site and
at patients home are:
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that stores the patient medical records, receives vital
signs from patients, and facilitates their decoding
and monitoring through specialized monitoring soft-
ware. In addition, it supports logging of all communi-
cations between the HCC and the attending doctors,
hospitals, or patients.
2. HCC Printers. These are a color inkjet printer for
printing vital signs, and a laser printer for printing
normal reports and letters.
3. Backup Media. These are magnetic tapes for back-up
of the data stored on the HCC Server.
4. Patients Home PC. This is the PC that will be installed
at the patients location for facilitating the encoding of
the vital signs and their transmission to the HCC.
5. Patients PVSM. These are the medical devices and
sensors recording vital signs.
6. PTT Telephone Line. This is a normal line (Fixed,
Cable or DSL) through which the patient can trans-
mit the vital signs to the HCC or communicate with
the doctors.
7. GPRS or UMTS or Satellite device. This device is
used as a back-up in the case that the conventional
telephone line is unavailable.
8. Internet Line. This is the line used to connect the HCC
to the Internet through an Internet Service Provider.
9. Communication Protocol. This will be the TCP/IP
protocol that will be used for any type of
communication.
10. HCCModem. This is the Modem that will be installed
at the HCC for supporting data collection from the
remote patient locations through the ﬁxed line.
11. Patients Home Modem. This is the Modem (Fixed,
Cable or DSL) that will be installed at the patients
home for supporting data transmission to the HCC
through the ﬁxed line.
The total value of the hardware assets has been estimat-
ed on a replacement cost basis and it is not expected to
exceed the amount of 22,000 Euro.
5.3. Software assets
The software assets required for the provision of the
VITAL-Home service are the following:
1. Medical Record Software. It is utilized for maintaining
and processing the electronic medical records of the
patients.
2. Vital Signs Monitoring Support Software. It constitutes
an application supporting the display of vital signs on
the HCC monitor.
3. Logging Support Software. It facilitates the maintenance
of a log ﬁle of most communication between the HCC
and attending doctors, hospitals or patients. It also sup-
ports recording of voice communication and ﬁling of
electronic documents and emails that may be exchanged.4. VITAL-DICOM Encoder Software. It encodes the vital
signs from the PVSM to the VITAL-DICOM format.
It will be executed on the patients PC.
5. VITAL-DICOM Decoder Software. It decodes the vital
signs received from the patient locations. It will be exe-
cuted on the HCC Server.
The total value of the software assets has been estimated
on a replacement cost basis and it is not expected to exceed
the amount of 38,000 Euro.
5.4. Evaluation of the threats
The next step is the evaluation of the threats that the
system is facing, as well as the identiﬁcation of the vulner-
abilities that may allow some threats to occur. These, in
turn, will provide us with the security-related needs of the
users. The evaluation of threats and vulnerabilities in con-
junction with the systems asset valuation are used to calcu-
late the risk level of each system asset. The following table
presents the important threats that the VITAL-Home sys-
tem is facing, together with the corresponding user needs
they lead to.
The threats presented in Table 1 can be analyzed further
down to more detailed causes. For example, ‘‘masquerad-
ing user identity’’ may be directed by insiders or outsiders
of the VITAL-Home system, therefore the threat can be
modeled as a result of these two causes. Apart from the
tabular form representation, the cause–eﬀect interrelation-
ships of threats, vulnerabilities and assets of the VITAL-
Home system can be represented in detail using depend-
ability modeling techniques, such as the Fault Trees
[16,10]. The basic services that constitute the successful sys-
tem operation are identiﬁed and their unavailability is ana-
lyzed to its causes in a top–down approach, using logical
AND–OR gates to model the causality. In the present case
study, the basic services of the VITAL-Home system can be
summarized in the following four operations:
(a) Home Monitoring Service,
(b) Vital Signs Collection Service,
(c) Reporting Service,
(d) HCC-Patient Communication Service,
where the speciﬁc details about each one of them have been
given previously. The unavailability of any of these services
will lead to the VITAL-Home system failure to satisfy the
speciﬁcations, which is a fact depicted by the logical-OR
gate of Fig. 3.
The four basic services can be further decomposed down
to the events leading to their unavailability, using the ﬁnd-
ings of the CRAMM analysis. The primary events of the
Fault Trees are the threats identiﬁed in the CRAMM anal-
ysis that can be no further decomposed, or their further
investigation is far beyond the scope of the analysis. In
Fig. 4, the Fault Tree of Home Monitoring Service is pre-
sented, where all the cause–eﬀect interactions leading to the
Table 1
VITAL-Homes important threats
Threat User need
1. Masquerading Authentication
2. Unauthorized use of an application Authorization
3. Introduction of damaging or
disruptive software
Viral software prevention
4. Misuse of system resources Controlled use of resources
5. Communications inﬁltration Conﬁdentiality
6. Technical failure of non-network host Network control
7. Technical failure of a host system Technical support
8. Theft Staﬀ integrity
9. Technical failure of print facility Technical support
10. Technical failure of network
distribution component
Technical support
11. Willful damage Staﬀ integrity
12. Technical failure of network interface Technical support
13. Technical failure of network services Service provision
14. Power failure Power supply availability
15. System or network software failure System quality
16. Application software failure Testing and quality
17. Operations error Operations control
18. Hardware maintenance error Technical support
19. Software maintenance error Technical support
20. User error Veriﬁcation
21. Fire Fire prevention
22. Water damage Flood prevention
23. Natural disaster ‘‘Acts of God’’ prevention
24. Staﬀ shortage Staﬀ availability
25. Terrorism Counterterrorist service
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gates. This Fault Tree is an illustrative way to map all the
undesirable events and their interactions leading to Home
Monitoring Service unavailability, while any possible esti-
mation for the probability of these events may lead to an
estimation for the service unavailability, based on the Fault
Tree semantics described above. However, the Fault Tree
model provides limited modeling capabilities comparing
to other dependability modeling techniques, such as the
Bayesian Networks, as far as fault diagnosis or criticality
ranking are concerned [18,21,22]. Furthermore, Bayesian
Networks provide an excellent environment for exploitingFig. 3. A simple Fault Tree model of aany possible statistical data or evidence for failure diagno-
sis or risk prioritization. The proposed methodology com-
bines the detailed risk analysis of information systems with
a Bayesian Network modeling of the interrelationships
among threats, vulnerabilities and assets, to illustrate the
results of the risk analysis and introduce risk prioritization
based on the Bayesian Networks semantics.
6. Bayesian Network modeling of the VITAL-Home system
and results
Bayesian Networks have long been applied in real-world
tasks since they provide a robust probabilistic method for
modeling under uncertainty. In the present context, Bayes-
ian Networks provide an excellent way for mapping the
ﬁndings of the risk analysis in a concise and illustrative
model. The root nodes of the network represent the threats
identiﬁed in the CRAMM analysis, which are no further
decomposed to their causes. These threats are related to
undesirable events for system operation and the interrela-
tionships can be expressed using the logical AND–OR for-
malism employed in Fault Trees. In other words, the
conditional probability tables of the child nodes are con-
structed based on the Boolean logic of the AND–OR gates
i.e., a child node representing an AND node will be in the
True state if and only if all the parent nodes are in the
True state. The proposed Bayesian Network framework
can incorporate even more complex probabilistic interrela-
tionships, such as ‘‘noisy-or’’ logical relationships or com-
mon cause failures [19–21].
The threats identiﬁed during the CRAMM risk analysis
can be categorized according to their probability of occur-
rence in ﬁve diﬀerent levels, characterized as ‘‘Very Low,’’
‘‘Low,’’ ‘‘Medium,’’ ‘‘High,’’ and ‘‘Very High,’’ while each
of these levels can be described by three diﬀerent sublevels.
The engineering expertise acquired during system opera-
tion as it is expressed by the information acquired during
interviews and questionnaires, and the existing speciﬁca-
tion reliability data for the hardware threats aim signiﬁ-
cantly in the estimation of their probability ofn OR gate for the VITAL system.
Fig. 4. Fault Tree of home monitoring service.
Fig. 5. Communication network unavailability modeled in the VITAL
system Bayesian Network.
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work model of the information system to estimate the pos-
terior probabilities of failure events during certain
scenarios of system operation. Risk prioritization of the
threats can be based on these ‘‘what–if’’ studies since their
likelihood of occurrence is estimated given the occurrence
of an undesirable event for system operation.
The ﬁndings of the VITAL-Home system risk analysis
have been modeled as a Bayesian Network. The model
has been implemented using the software package MSBNx
[23]. The nodes of the network present the threats or unde-
sirable events in general that have been explored during the
risk analysis. The threats that are closely related are
grouped and inﬂuence a child node of a resulting undesir-
able event to build a modular and ﬂexible network. For
example, as it is depicted in Fig. 5, the communication net-
work unavailability (node ‘‘Net’’) is a child node inﬂuenced
by the unavailability of the two communication networks
(Mobile and Fixed), which in turn is inﬂuenced by the
unavailability of their corresponding line and service. Fur-
thermore in Fig. 6, the part of the Bayesian Network that
models the threats inﬂuencing the successful operation of
the server and their interactions is presented.
Using the Bayesian Network semantics, the most critical
threats can be identiﬁed, given the fact that the VITAL-
Home system has failed, by calculating the posterior
probabilities of the node-states. Furthermore, the four basic
services of the VITAL-Home system can be further investi-
gated, by assuming that each one has failed and calculating
the posterior probabilities of occurrence for the threats.
These ‘‘what–if’’ studies have been executed, the top seven
threats have been ranked according to their posterior prob-
abilities of occurrence and the results are depicted in Table 2.The most critical threat for the VITAL-Home system
and each of the basic services is the power failure of the
server, while the power failure of the home PC is the second
most critical failure for the VITAL-Home system, the
Home Monitoring Service and the HCC Patient Communi-
cation Service. The deﬁciency of power supply is mainly
rooted from sudden interruptions or low power quality
(high harmonics of load current, voltage sags etc), which
are usual phenomena in islands or areas isolated from the
main power grid. A possible countermeasure for power
failures is the use of a UPS in combination with a small
generating unit on the single site of the server, while the
home PC power supply reliability can be improved by the
use of a UPS since it is characterized by an acceptable cost.
The implementation of these countermeasures will signiﬁ-
cantly limit the vulnerability of the system by the air-con-
ditioning failure, which is a high-risk failure for the HCC
Fig. 6. Model of the threats inﬂuencing the successful operation of the server.
Table 2
The high risk threats for the VITAL-Home system and its basic services identiﬁed using the Bayesian Network modeling and the ﬁndings of the CRAMM
analysis
Home monitoring service Reporting service HCC patient communication
service
Vital signs service System
Power failure server Power failure server Power failure server Power failure server Power failure server
Power failure home PC System and network
software failure server
Power failure home PC Medical record software
failure
Power failure home PC
System and network
software failure PVSM
Air condition failure
server
System and network
software failure home PC
Monitor support
software
System and network
software failure PVSM
User error vital signals
encoding
User error log support
software
System and network
software failure server
VITAL-DICOM
decoder software
Monitor support software
failure
VITAL-DICOM encoder Masquerading user
outsiders
Air condition failure server System and network
software failure server
Medical record software
failure
System and network
software failure home PC
Logging support
software
User error software
reporting service
Air condition failure
server
VITAL-DICOM encoder
System and network
software failure server
Hardware failure server Hardware failure server Hardware failure server VITAL-DICOM decoder
software
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Service.
Furthermore, high-risk threats for the VITAL-Home
system are ‘‘system and network software failure of Porta-
ble Vital Signs Monitoring’’, ‘‘Monitor support software
failure’’ and ‘‘medical record software failure’’. The Porta-
ble Vital Signs Monitor (PVSM) is located at the patients
site and it receives the critical input data for the wholeVITAL-Home system, while ‘‘Monitor Support Software’’
supports the display of vital signs on the HCC monitor and
the medical record software manage personal data of the
patients. A high level of reliability must characterize these
services since they are at the ﬁnal stage of the VITAL-
Home system operation and physicians depend very much
on the output of these services, with limited chances to verify
the obtained results. Therefore, a possible countermeasure
646 I. Maglogiannis et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 39 (2006) 637–647to combat these threats is the extensive implementation of
veriﬁcation and validation procedures during the develop-
ment and maintenance of these software units, which
should be also applied periodically during the ﬁeld opera-
tion of the VITAL-Home system, to detect any deviations
timely and calibrate the system accordingly. This counter-
measure may be implemented also to the VITAL-DICOM
Encoder and Decoder software, whose failures appear to
be two other high-risk threats. Furthermore, another pos-
sible countermeasure is the periodic backup of the medical
data and patients records managed by the system for a
quick and reliable restoration in case of a possible software
failure and loss of data.
In Table 2, there are a number of high-risk threats
related to the human factor, such as user errors in using
the software assets of the VITAL-Home system andTable 3
Ranking of the VITAL-Home system threats based on the Bayesian
Network conditional probabilities
Power failure server
Power failure home PC
System and network software failure PVSM
User error vital signals encoding
VITAL-DICOM encoder/decoder failure
System and network sw failure of home PC/Server
HW maintenance error of PVSM/home PC/Server
Air conditioning failure of the server
User error in application SW of reporting service
Fire or water damage at home PC
MASQ. user identity at home monitoring service by outsiders
User error in application SW of vital signs collection service
Logging support SW of reporting service
Network failure of PTT service
SW maintenance error at home PC/Server
Technical failure of network host at the server
Unauthorized use of application
Wilful damage by insider at home PC
Technical failure of non-network host at home PC
Theft by outsiders at the server
Introduction of damaging or disruptive SW at the server/home PC
Internet service fails
Misuse of system resources at home PC/Server
Wilful damage by outsiders at the server/home PC
Communication inﬁltration by outsiders
Theft at the home PC/Server
Communication inﬁltration by contracted services providers
Fire at the server
Internet line failure at the reporting service
MASQ. user identity at home monitoring service etc by contracted service
provider
Server modem failure
Operation error at the PVSM/home PC/Server
Home pc modem failure
Network failure of PTT line
Communication protocol failure at the home monitoring service
Wilful damage by insider at server communication inﬁltration by insiders
Masquerading user identity by insiders
Natural disaster at the home PC
Natural disaster at the server
Staﬀ shortage at the server
Terrorism at the home PC/Server
Water damage at the server‘‘Masquerading the User Identity’’ during system opera-
tion. These threats may result in erratic input to the sys-
tem and deterioration of system conﬁdentiality, which
may discourage physicians and patients of further use.
There are a number of possible countermeasures to limit
the vulnerability of the VITAL-Home system to these
threats, such as proper training of the VITAL-Home sys-
tem users and enhanced security options for system
operation.
Finally, in Table 3 a more detailed of list of threats as
they are ranked by the Bayesian Network model given
the VITAL-Home system has failed. A corresponding list
is constructed for each of the ﬁve basic system services,
which the results of Table 2 stem from.
7. Conclusions
Healthcare information and patient monitoring sys-
tems are safety–critical applications managing and pro-
cessing valuable personal information of patients. Risk
analysis and management of such systems is a necessity,
to improve the quality of the provided services and
encourage the implementation of technology in new areas
of application. An improved methodology has been pre-
sented that combines basic features of the CRAMM risk
analysis method with the Bayesian Network modeling
technique to identify assets, threats and vulnerabilities
of patient telemonitoring systems and present these inter-
relationships in a concise and ﬂexible model. The Bayes-
ian Network semantics support the representation of
complex interactions among and has been compared to
classical dependability modeling techniques, such as the
Fault Trees.
A patient monitoring system (VITAL-Home) was pre-
sented and the systems assets, threats and vulnerabilities
have been thoroughly analyzed using the basic features of
the CRAMM risk analysis framework. The ﬁndings of
the analysis have been used to develop a Bayesian Network
model to rank the threats with the highest risk, based on
their posterior probability of occurrence in the case of
the basic services and system failure. The proposed model
provides the ability to perform complicated inferences by
exploiting any possible evidence of system operation, while
it is characterized by a ﬂexibility of modeling more compli-
cated dependencies in any future system modiﬁcations. The
power supply failure of VITAL-Home systems server and
patients home PCs were detected as the highest risk
threats. Moreover, threats concerning failures in certain
software modules, user errors or data security exhibit also
high risk. Several countermeasures were suggested to limit
the vulnerability of the VITAL-Home system operation to
these threats, such as the adoption of UPS devices or small
power generating units, extensive monitoring of the soft-
wares impeccable operation by testing, veriﬁcation, and
validation procedures, backup of medical data, training
for the users of the VITAL-Home system and adoption
of strict security options.
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